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   1	  
Abstract	  
As	  the	  science	  related	  to	  genetic	  engineering	  becomes	  more	  advanced,	  more	  and	  more	  ethical	  
questions	  relating	  to	  technologies	  such	  as	  CRISPR	  and	  preimplantation	  genetic	  diagnosis	  (PGD)	  arise.	  If	  
we	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  choose	  the	  genes	  of	  our	  future	  children	  in	  order	  have	  children	  with	  our	  
desired	  characteristics,	  should	  we	  do	  so?	  Is	  it	  okay	  to	  mess	  with	  some	  genes	  of	  your	  future	  child	  and	  not	  
others?	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  discuss	  arguments	  and	  objections	  associated	  with	  these	  questions.	  The	  aim	  of	  
this	  paper	  is	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  ethical	  to	  alter	  the	  DNA	  of	  your	  future	  child	  or	  select	  a	  specific	  child	  only	  
when	  you	  are	  attempting	  to	  improve	  the	  health	  of	  that	  child.	  	  
	  
	   Many	  might	  find	  the	  possibility	  of	  designing	  their	  own	  baby	  exciting.	  What	  could	  be	  
better	  than	  creating	  the	  exact	  baby	  that	  you	  have	  always	  dreamed	  of?	  While	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  
fantasize	  about	  the	  positives	  of	  genetic	  engineering,	  when	  we	  really	  dig	  deep	  into	  what	  such	  
technology	  would	  mean	  for	  society,	  many	  problems	  emerge.	  How	  do	  we	  decide	  which	  genes	  
are	  ethical	  to	  alter	  and	  which	  aren’t?	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  unethical	  to	  alter	  your	  
future	  child’s	  genes	  or	  select	  a	  certain	  embryo	  unless	  you	  are	  doing	  so	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  
child’s	  health.	  My	  paper	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  In	  section	  1,	  I	  explain	  current	  genetic	  
technologies.	  In	  section	  2,	  I	  present	  Julian	  Savulescu	  and	  Guy	  Kahane’s	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  
genetic	  enhancements.	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  explain	  Martha	  Nussbaum’s	  objective	  list	  theory	  of	  well-­‐
being.	  In	  section	  4,	  I	  discuss	  arguments	  related	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  wanting	  good	  health	  
for	  your	  child	  and	  wanting	  your	  child	  to	  have	  extraordinary	  abilities.	  In	  section	  5,	  I	  present	  the	  
Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View,	  a	  view	  I	  find	  to	  be	  stronger	  than	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane’s	  view	  
explained	  in	  section	  2.	  In	  section	  6,	  I	  discuss	  the	  eugenic	  objection.	  In	  section	  7,	  I	  discuss	  
Elizabeth	  Barnes’	  disability	  objection.	  In	  section	  8,	  I	  discuss	  Michael	  Sandel’s	  ‘Life	  is	  a	  Gift’	  
objection.	  In	  section	  9,	  I	  discuss	  equality	  in	  relation	  to	  genetic	  engineering.	  I	  conclude	  my	  
findings	  in	  section	  10.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	   2	  
Section	  1:	  Current	  Genetic	  Technologies	  
	  
	   There	  are	  currently	  several	  procreative	  genetic	  technologies	  in	  use.	  Preimplantation	  
genetic	  diagnosis	  (PGD)	  requires	  in	  vitro	  fertilization	  (IVF)	  and	  single	  sperm	  injection	  (S&K,	  275).	  
IVF	  is	  a	  process	  of	  fertilization	  where	  an	  egg	  and	  sperm	  are	  combined	  outside	  of	  the	  body.	  The	  
fertilized	  egg	  or	  embryo	  is	  then	  implanted	  into	  the	  woman’s	  uterus	  (Mayo	  Clinic	  Staff,	  1).	  PGD	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  detect	  chromosomal	  abnormalities	  and	  single	  gene	  disorders	  (S&K,	  275).	  There	  
is	  a	  newly	  developed	  version	  of	  PGD	  called	  pre-­‐implantation	  genetic	  haplotyping	  (PGH)	  that	  
may	  allow	  testing	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  conditions	  and	  can	  greatly	  expand	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  
selection	  (S&K,	  275).	  Gene	  chips	  are	  devices	  that	  are	  around	  the	  same	  size	  as	  postage	  stamps	  
and	  are	  based	  on	  a	  glass	  substrate	  wafer.	  Gene	  chips	  contain	  many	  tiny	  cells,	  each	  cell	  holding	  
DNA	  from	  a	  different	  human	  gene	  (Quinion,	  1).	  As	  gene	  chips	  are	  developed,	  thousands	  of	  
genes	  could	  potentially	  be	  tested	  at	  once.	  A	  recently	  developed	  genetic	  test	  requiring	  the	  use	  
of	  gene	  chips	  called	  ACTN3	  can	  “identify	  physical	  talent	  at	  either	  endurance	  or	  sprinting	  events,	  
and	  a	  single	  gene	  polymorphism	  has	  been	  postulated	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  perfect	  pitch”	  (S&K,	  
275-­‐276).	  CRISPR	  technology	  is	  a	  new	  and	  powerful	  way	  to	  edit	  genomes.	  Researchers	  are	  
easily	  able	  to	  alter	  DNA	  sequences	  and	  modify	  gene	  function	  (Vidyasagar,	  1).	  CRISPR	  is	  short	  for	  
“CRISPR-­‐Cas9”.	  “CRISPRs	  are	  specialized	  stretches	  of	  DNA,	  and	  Cas9	  is	  an	  enzyme	  that	  acts	  like	  
a	  pair	  of	  molecular	  scissors,	  capable	  of	  cutting	  strands	  of	  DNA”	  (Vidyasagar,	  1).	  There	  is	  ethical	  
concern	  with	  choosing	  embryos	  according	  to	  non-­‐disease	  characteristics	  (S&K,	  276),	  as	  well	  as	  
using	  CRISPR	  with	  the	  purpose	  altering	  DNA	  sequences	  related	  to	  non-­‐disease	  characteristics.	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Section	  2:	  An	  Argument	  in	  Favor	  of	  Genetic	  Enhancements	  
	   In	  their	  paper,	  The	  Moral	  Obligation	  to	  Create	  Children	  with	  the	  Best	  Chance	  of	  the	  Best	  
Life,	  Julian	  Savulescu	  and	  Guy	  Kahane	  argue	  that	  we	  must	  select	  from	  amongst	  the	  children	  we	  
can	  have,	  the	  ones	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  life.	  They	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  view	  called	  The	  
Principle	  of	  Procreative	  Beneficence(PB),	  which	  states:	  	  
If	  couples	  (or	  single	  reproducers)	  have	  decided	  to	  have	  a	  child,	  and	  selection	  is	  possible,	  
then	  they	  have	  a	  significant	  moral	  reason	  to	  select	  the	  child,	  of	  the	  possible	  children	  
they	  could	  have,	  whose	  life	  can	  be	  expected,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  relevant	  available	  
information,	  to	  go	  best	  or	  at	  least	  not	  worse	  than	  any	  of	  the	  others	  (Savulescu	  and	  
Kahane,	  274).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  natural	  for	  parents	  to	  want	  to	  have	  the	  best	  child	  that	  they	  can.	  Future	  parents	  
already	  try	  to	  do	  so	  in	  various	  ways.	  They	  try	  to	  find	  a	  well	  endowed	  partner	  and	  try	  to	  conceive	  
at	  a	  time	  when	  “they	  have	  built	  sufficient	  financial,	  material,	  and	  emotional	  resources	  to	  
provide	  a	  good	  life	  for	  their	  child”	  (S&K,	  276).	  If	  parents	  are	  already	  trying	  to	  have	  the	  best	  child	  
with	  the	  best	  life,	  why	  shouldn’t	  they	  utilize	  these	  new	  genetic	  enhancement	  strategies?	  	  
Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  write,	  	  
Even	  those	  who	  deny	  that	  parents	  are	  allowed	  to	  select	  the	  most	  advantaged	  child	  will	  
often	  admit	  that	  parents	  should	  hope	  for	  a	  child	  who	  is	  naturally	  endowed	  with	  talents	  
and	  capacities	  that	  will	  make	  it	  likelier	  that	  she	  will	  lead	  a	  good	  life.	  When	  people	  have	  
such	  wishes,	  they	  may	  be	  implicitly	  recognizing	  the	  normative	  force	  of	  PB	  (S&K,	  278).	  	  
	  
While	  this	  is	  true,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  people	  that	  object	  to	  PB	  object	  to	  it	  because	  of	  any	  
views	  that	  conflict	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  statement.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  wanting	  
the	  best	  for	  your	  child	  and	  actively	  intervening	  with	  their	  genetic	  make	  up	  in	  order	  to	  make	  that	  
happen.	  When	  parents	  try	  to	  create	  a	  specific	  child	  based	  on	  what	  they	  desire,	  many	  problems	  
arise—one	  being	  that	  it	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  parents	  to	  accept	  their	  children	  for	  who	  they	  
are.	  Sandel	  argues	  that	  genetic	  engineering	  would	  prevent	  parents	  from	  treating	  the	  sense	  of	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life	  as	  a	  gift,	  and	  that	  genetic	  engineering	  would	  increase	  the	  already	  toxic	  practice	  of	  “hyper-­‐
parenting”	  (Sandel	  61).	  Robert	  Sparrow	  argues	  that	  genetic	  engineering	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  
eugenic-­‐like	  world	  (Sparrow	  32).	  I	  will	  elaborate	  more	  on	  these	  in	  sections	  6	  and	  8.	  	  
While	  at	  first	  glance	  PB	  seems	  extreme,	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  back	  it	  up	  with	  
convincing	  arguments.	  They	  write	  that	  based	  on	  common	  intuition,	  most	  would	  agree	  that	  
future	  parents	  who	  are	  indifferent	  to	  whether	  their	  future	  child	  will	  be	  born	  with	  the	  potential	  
for	  a	  good	  life	  are	  morally	  flawed.	  They	  do	  not	  give	  a	  reason	  for	  this,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  this	  is	  a	  fair	  
assumption	  to	  make.	  Why	  would	  a	  parent	  want	  anything	  but	  a	  good	  life	  for	  their	  child,	  a	  person	  
they	  will	  care	  so	  deeply	  about	  and	  for	  whom	  they	  are	  deeply	  responsible?	  They	  argue	  that	  
future	  parents	  are	  already	  trying	  to	  create	  the	  child	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  a	  good	  life,	  just	  in	  
different	  ways.	  When	  dating,	  people	  often	  take	  into	  consideration	  their	  partner’s	  genetic	  
attributes	  as	  well	  as	  their	  parenting	  potential.	  Future	  parents	  also	  decide	  to	  conceive	  at	  a	  time	  
when	  they	  are	  financially	  and	  emotionally	  stable.	  Both	  of	  these	  behaviors	  involve	  attempting	  to	  
create	  a	  child	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  life	  (S&K,	  276).	  	  
	   Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  explain	  a	  specific	  case	  in	  which	  our	  moral	  intuitions	  are	  the	  
clearest.	  They	  tell	  us	  to	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  the	  rubella	  virus	  mutates	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
makes	  it	  resistant	  to	  the	  current	  vaccination,	  causing	  a	  rubella	  epidemic	  to	  occur.	  A	  couple	  
decides	  to	  have	  a	  child.	  If	  the	  woman	  gets	  pregnant	  now,	  and	  she	  hasn’t	  been	  immunized	  or	  
her	  immunity	  has	  worn	  off,	  she	  will	  most	  likely	  contract	  rubella,	  which	  would	  cause	  the	  baby	  to	  
be	  born	  with	  congenital	  rubella—blind,	  deaf,	  and	  with	  severe	  brain	  damage.	  The	  woman	  knows	  
that	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  the	  epidemic	  will	  have	  passed	  and	  that	  she	  will	  most	  likely	  have	  a	  
normal	  child	  if	  she	  waits	  (S&K,	  276).	  I	  think	  that	  most	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  woman	  should	  wait	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a	  couple	  of	  months	  before	  attempting	  conception	  so	  she	  could	  have	  a	  child	  that	  is	  not	  blind,	  
deaf,	  and	  brain	  damaged.	  But	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  take	  it	  one	  step	  further	  when	  they	  write,	  	  
Indeed,	  we	  believe	  that	  many	  would	  further	  agree	  that	  if,	  because	  of	  some	  medical	  
condition,	  a	  couple	  could	  have	  either	  a	  child	  with	  average	  health	  and	  talents	  now	  or	  an	  
especially	  healthy	  and	  gifted	  child	  if	  they	  waited	  one	  month,	  then	  the	  couple	  has	  a	  
reason	  to	  wait	  before	  having	  a	  child	  (S&K,	  276).	  
	  
They	  once	  again	  back	  up	  this	  idea	  by	  explaining	  that	  couples	  wait	  years	  to	  build	  different	  types	  
of	  resources	  to	  provide	  their	  future	  child	  with	  the	  best	  possible	  environment	  in	  which	  to	  grow.	  
They	  conclude	  that	  “it	  is	  in	  fact	  implicit	  in	  commonsense	  morality	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  permissible	  
and	  often	  expected	  of	  parents	  to	  select	  the	  child	  with	  the	  greatest	  potential	  for	  well-­‐being.”	  
(S&K,	  277).	  	  
	   Their	  argument	  is	  definitely	  convincing.	  If	  we	  already	  try	  to	  increase	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  
our	  future	  children	  and	  this	  is	  just	  another	  way	  to	  do	  so,	  what	  could	  be	  so	  wrong	  with	  that?	  
While	  I	  agree	  that	  in	  the	  case	  presented,	  the	  woman	  should	  wait	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  child	  
without	  the	  rubella	  virus,	  I	  find	  this	  to	  be	  inherently	  different	  from	  their	  second	  case,	  in	  which	  a	  
couple	  should	  wait	  a	  month	  to	  have	  an	  especially	  healthy	  and	  gifted	  child,	  rather	  than	  have	  a	  
child	  with	  average	  health	  and	  talents.	  There	  is	  a	  huge	  difference	  between	  preventing	  disability	  
and	  promoting	  extraordinary	  ability.	  When	  parents	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  disability,	  they	  are	  
trying	  to	  promote	  their	  future	  child’s	  overall	  level	  of	  health.	  Parents	  want	  their	  children	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  exercise	  normal	  human	  functioning	  capabilities,	  so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  disadvantaged	  in	  
life	  from	  the	  start.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  parents	  that	  focus	  on	  promoting	  extraordinary	  ability	  are	  
trying	  to	  reach	  a	  certain	  goal	  that	  they	  have	  for	  their	  future	  child.	  When	  parents	  try	  to	  design	  
‘perfect	  children’,	  they	  inevitably	  impact	  their	  relationship	  with	  their	  future	  children	  by	  having	  
an	  already-­‐set	  idea	  of	  who	  they	  want	  their	  child	  to	  be.	  If	  parents	  use	  their	  time,	  energy,	  and	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money	  on	  trying	  to	  make	  their	  child	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  their	  child	  does	  not	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  what	  
they	  wanted,	  they	  may	  feel	  disappointed	  and	  damage	  the	  parent-­‐child	  relationship.	  	  
	  
Section	  3:	  Objective	  List	  Theory	  of	  Well-­‐Being	  
In	  order	  to	  fully	  comprehend	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane’s	  argument,	  we	  must	  have	  an	  idea	  
of	  what	  ‘well-­‐being’	  means	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  in	  her	  paper,	  Human	  
Capabilities,	  Female	  Human	  Beings,	  explains	  her	  view	  about	  well-­‐being	  and	  human	  flourishing.	  
She	  believes	  that	  well-­‐being	  involves	  having	  the	  capability	  to	  exercise	  human	  functionings,	  and	  
that	  capabilities	  are	  divided	  into	  two	  levels:	  threshold	  and	  flourishing	  levels.	  According	  to	  
Nussbaum,	  the	  fewer	  capabilities	  you	  have,	  the	  less	  likely	  you	  are	  to	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  life	  of	  
human	  flourishing.	  	  
The	  first	  and	  threshold	  level	  of	  human	  flourishing	  includes	  the	  following	  human	  
functionings:	  having	  an	  aversion	  to	  death,	  hunger	  and	  thirst,	  need	  for	  shelter,	  sexual	  desire,	  
mobility,	  capacity	  for	  pleasure	  and	  pain,	  cognitive	  capability,	  early	  infant	  development,	  
practical	  reason,	  affiliation	  with	  other	  human	  beings,	  relatedness	  to	  other	  species	  and	  to	  
nature,	  humor	  and	  play,	  separateness	  (proceeding	  on	  a	  separate	  path	  through	  the	  world	  from	  
birth	  to	  death),	  and	  strong	  separateness	  (Nusbaum,	  76-­‐80).	  By	  strong	  separateness,	  Nussbaum	  
means	  that	  each	  human	  life	  has	  its	  own	  peculiar	  context	  and	  surroundings	  that	  are	  not	  exactly	  
the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  anyone	  else	  (Nussbaum,	  80).	  The	  second	  level	  of	  human	  flourishing	  
includes	  the	  following	  capabilities:	  being	  able	  to	  the	  live	  to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  human	  life	  or	  normal	  
length,	  have	  good	  health,	  be	  adequately	  nourished,	  have	  adequate	  shelter,	  have	  the	  
opportunity	  for	  sexual	  satisfaction,	  have	  the	  choice	  in	  matters	  of	  reproduction,	  move	  from	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place	  to	  place,	  avoid	  unnecessary	  and	  non-­‐beneficial	  pain,	  have	  pleasurable	  experiences,	  use	  
the	  senses,	  have	  attachments	  to	  things	  and	  persons	  outside	  ourselves,	  form	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  
good	  and	  engage	  in	  critical	  reflection	  about	  the	  planning	  of	  one’s	  own	  life,	  live	  for	  and	  to	  
others,	  live	  with	  concern	  for	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  animals,	  plants,	  and	  the	  world	  of	  nature,	  laugh,	  
play,	  and	  enjoy	  recreational	  activities,	  and	  live	  one’s	  own	  life	  and	  nobody	  else’s	  (Nussbaum,	  83-­‐
85).	  	  
Nussbaum	  believes	  that	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing	  is	  compatible	  with	  most	  disabilities.	  
While	  being	  deaf	  would	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  human	  flourishing,	  a	  deaf	  person,	  according	  to	  
Nussbaum,	  is	  still	  capable	  of	  living	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  even	  though	  it	  would	  be	  more	  
difficult	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  a	  person	  with	  Tay-­‐Sachs	  disease.	  The	  reason	  we	  
must	  conclude	  that	  Tay-­‐Sachs	  is	  incompatible	  with	  living	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing	  is	  because	  a	  
person	  with	  Tay-­‐Sachs	  fails	  to	  achieve	  a	  threshold	  level	  of	  capabilities	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
human	  functioning	  (Nussbaum,	  76-­‐85).	  	  
While	  a	  person	  can	  have	  a	  disability	  and	  still	  live	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  wouldn’t	  we	  
want	  to,	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity,	  to	  give	  our	  future	  children	  every	  capability	  that	  Nussbaum	  
mentions?	  Wouldn’t	  we	  want	  to	  give	  our	  children	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  opportunities	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  
human	  flourishing?	  Any	  challenge	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing	  makes	  the	  
reality	  of	  being	  able	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing	  less	  likely.	  If	  there	  are	  two	  people	  with	  
exactly	  the	  same	  capabilities	  except	  for	  one	  of	  them	  being	  deaf,	  the	  non-­‐deaf	  person	  is	  more	  
likely	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing	  than	  the	  deaf	  person.	  If	  it	  is	  in	  our	  control,	  shouldn't	  we	  
do	  our	  best	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  our	  children	  are	  capable	  of	  living	  lives	  of	  human	  flourishing?	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Section	  4:	  Good	  Health	  vs.	  Extraordinary	  Abilities	  
Why	  do	  we	  consider	  health	  to	  be	  such	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  human	  flourishing?	  What	  is	  the	  
difference	  between	  wanting	  your	  child	  to	  be	  healthy	  and	  wanting	  your	  child	  to	  be	  
extraordinary?	  Michael	  J.	  Sandel,	  in	  his	  book,	  The	  Case	  Against	  Perfection,	  addresses	  the	  
argument	  associated	  with	  PB	  that	  a	  parent’s	  obligation	  to	  heal	  a	  sick	  child	  implies	  an	  obligation	  
to	  enhance	  a	  healthy	  one,	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  his	  or	  her	  potential	  for	  success.	  He	  explains	  that	  
this	  is	  true	  “only	  if	  one	  accepts	  the	  utilitarian	  idea	  that	  health	  is	  not	  a	  distinctive	  human	  good,	  
but	  simply	  a	  means	  of	  maximizing	  happiness	  or	  well-­‐being”	  (Sandel	  47).	  Sandel	  explains	  that	  
good	  health	  is	  a	  constitutive	  element	  of	  human	  flourishing	  (Sandel	  47).	  I	  think	  Sandel	  means	  
that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  person	  to	  live	  a	  “normal”	  life	  and	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  what	  they	  
want;	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  them	  to	  be	  healthy	  enough	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  a	  
person	  to	  fully	  flourish	  in	  society	  if	  they	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  being	  sick.	  
Sandel	  thinks	  that	  while	  some	  talents	  and	  traits	  bring	  success	  into	  a	  competitive	  society	  
and	  can	  be	  maximized,	  good	  health	  is	  different.	  It	  would	  be	  unusual	  to	  aspire	  to	  be	  the	  
healthiest	  person	  alive,	  like	  one	  aspires	  to	  be	  the	  most	  athletic	  or	  the	  most	  beautiful.	  Sandel	  
refers	  to	  health	  as	  a	  “bounded	  good”,	  writing	  that	  parents	  are	  able	  to	  seek	  it	  for	  their	  children	  
without	  risk	  of	  being	  drawn	  into	  an	  “ever-­‐escalating	  arms	  race”	  (Sandel	  49).	  By	  “bounded	  
good,”	  Sandel	  means	  a	  good	  with	  an	  upper	  limit—a	  good	  that	  one	  cannot	  have	  more	  and	  more	  
of.	  When	  parents	  try	  to	  have	  a	  healthy	  child,	  they	  are	  not	  converting	  their	  children	  into	  
“products	  of	  their	  will	  or	  instruments	  of	  their	  ambition”	  (Sandel	  49).	  Parents	  that	  are	  obsessed	  
with	  enhancing	  their	  children	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  “overreach,	  to	  express	  and	  entrench	  
attitudes	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  norm	  of	  unconditional	  love”	  (Sandel	  49).	  	  This	  is	  a	  core	  difference	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between	  preventing	  disability	  and	  promoting	  extraordinary	  ability.	  We	  cannot	  say	  that	  a	  parent	  
that	  wants	  their	  child	  to	  be	  healthy	  is	  exercising	  hyper-­‐parenting	  –they	  are	  not	  hoping	  for	  the	  
‘best’	  child,	  they	  are	  simply	  hoping	  for	  a	  healthy	  one.	  	  	  
There	  are	  reasons	  to	  try	  to	  have	  a	  healthy	  child	  that	  are	  not	  analogous	  to	  wanting	  to	  
design	  a	  perfect	  child.	  Parents	  want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  spend	  time	  with	  their	  children	  without	  
constantly	  worrying	  about	  when	  their	  next	  doctor’s	  appointment	  is,	  or	  how	  much	  pain	  their	  
child	  is	  in.	  They	  also	  want	  their	  children	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  pursuing	  their	  interests,	  and	  capable	  of	  
having	  a	  variety	  of	  ambitions.	  Asthma	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this—many	  children	  that	  are	  
interested	  in	  pursuing	  sports	  are	  unable	  to	  because	  they	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  breathing	  while	  
playing.	  It	  is	  much	  harder	  for	  a	  person	  with	  health	  issues	  to	  live	  the	  life	  that	  they	  want	  to	  live.	  If	  
we	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  away	  these	  unnecessary	  burdens	  on	  both	  parent	  and	  child,	  why	  
shouldn’t	  we?	  
	  
Section	  5:	  The	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  
	   In	  this	  section,	  I	  explain	  the	  view	  that	  we	  must	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  prevention	  of	  
suffering	  and	  promotion	  of	  health	  when	  discussing	  genetic	  engineering,	  a	  view	  that	  is	  
compatible	  with	  Sandel’s	  arguments	  in	  section	  4.	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  present	  the	  Prevention	  
of	  Harm	  View	  and	  then	  defend	  PB	  against	  it.	  The	  Prevention	  of	  Harm	  View	  is:	  “If	  reproducers	  
have	  decided	  to	  have	  a	  child,	  and	  selection	  is	  possible,	  then	  they	  have	  a	  significant	  moral	  
reason	  to	  select	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  children	  they	  could	  have	  who	  is	  expected	  to	  experience	  
least	  suffering	  or	  limited	  opportunity	  or	  serious	  loss	  of	  happiness	  or	  good	  compared	  to	  the	  
others”	  (S&K,	  281).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  no	  one	  has	  specifically	  argued	  for	  the	  Prevention	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of	  Harm	  View,	  which	  is	  why	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  do	  not	  cite	  anyone.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  because	  
they	  should	  not	  have	  used	  the	  word	  ‘Harm’	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  view	  because	  it	  is	  misleading	  
and	  does	  not	  correlate	  with	  what	  the	  view	  is	  trying	  to	  say.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  word	  harm	  implies	  
an	  action.	  One	  can	  cause	  harm	  to	  another.	  This	  is	  different	  from	  suffering.	  Buchanan,	  Brock,	  
Daniels,	  and	  Wikler	  write,	  “Some	  genetic	  interventions—those	  that	  prevent	  a	  genetic	  
impairment	  by	  preventing	  an	  individual	  who	  would	  have	  the	  impairment	  from	  coming	  into	  
existence—cannot	  be	  described	  as	  preventing	  harm,	  if	  a	  harm	  is	  a	  worsening	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  
a	  particular	  individual.	  If	  the	  individual	  does	  not	  exist,	  then	  the	  intervention	  cannot	  worsen	  his	  
condition”	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  19).	  If	  there	  is	  a	  person	  who	  is	  in	  love	  with	  their	  best	  friend,	  but	  their	  
best	  friend	  isn’t	  in	  love	  with	  them	  back,	  could	  we	  say	  that	  their	  best	  friend	  is	  causing	  them	  
harm?	  It	  seems	  that	  because	  no	  one	  intentionally	  caused	  the	  other	  one	  pain,	  no	  harm	  occurred.	  
What	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  the	  unrequited	  love	  caused	  the	  person	  to	  suffer.	  When	  parents	  are	  
selecting	  their	  children,	  they	  are	  not	  trying	  to	  prevent	  harm,	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  prevent	  
suffering.	  A	  pregnant	  mother	  can	  cause	  her	  future	  child	  harm	  by	  smoking	  cigarettes,	  but	  if	  a	  
baby	  is	  going	  to	  be	  born	  with	  a	  disease	  without	  any	  action	  of	  the	  parents,	  no	  harm	  is	  occurring.	  
It	  seems	  that	  this	  is	  the	  point	  that	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Harm	  View	  is	  trying	  to	  make.	  Therefore,	  I	  
am	  going	  to	  rename	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Harm	  View	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View.	  	  
Common	  sense	  intuitions	  seem	  to	  be	  stronger	  when	  reproductive	  choices	  aim	  to	  
prevent	  suffering	  rather	  than	  create	  a	  child	  with	  very	  good	  prospects	  (S&K,	  281).	  An	  important	  
strength	  of	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  is	  that	  it	  accords	  with	  our	  human	  intuitions.	  One	  
reason	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  prefer	  PB	  to	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  is	  because	  PB	  
allows	  parents	  to	  decide	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  “best	  life”,	  while	  the	  Prevention	  of	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Suffering	  View	  does	  not.	  They	  write,	  “Those	  born	  with	  the	  greatest	  gifts	  and	  talents	  may	  
squander	  them	  while	  those	  born	  into	  great	  hardship	  may	  overcome	  enormous	  obstacles	  to	  lead	  
the	  best	  of	  lives”	  (S&K,	  278).	  They	  back	  up	  the	  idea	  that	  parents	  being	  able	  to	  choose	  what	  is	  
considered	  the	  “best	  life”	  is	  an	  advantage	  with	  this	  quote,	  in	  which	  they	  are	  saying	  that	  quality	  
of	  life	  is	  not	  always	  based	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  is	  born	  into	  hardship	  or	  not.	  People	  can	  be	  
born	  with	  every	  advantage	  in	  the	  world	  and	  still	  live	  average	  lives,	  while	  others	  can	  be	  born	  
with	  every	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  world	  and	  live	  spectacular	  lives.	  Many	  times	  suffering	  through	  
hardship	  is	  good,	  because	  it	  can	  strengthen	  a	  person	  and	  lead	  to	  them	  living	  better	  lives	  than	  
they	  would	  have	  if	  they	  didn’t	  have	  to	  overcome	  such	  obstacles.	  They	  explain	  that	  on	  the	  
Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View,	  “reproducers	  should	  not	  select	  children	  who	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  
endure	  significant	  suffering	  or	  hardship	  even	  if	  these	  children	  are	  also	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  high	  
overall	  level	  of	  well-­‐being”	  (S&K,	  281).	  They	  think	  that	  preventing	  suffering	  will	  not	  always	  lead	  
to	  overall	  greater	  well-­‐	  being,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  find	  it	  important	  that	  PB	  leaves	  everything	  
open,	  preventing	  diseases	  as	  well	  as	  improving	  abilities.	  
Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  prefer	  PB	  over	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  because	  PB	  
allows	  parents	  to	  decide	  what	  a	  “best	  life”	  entails,	  and	  lets	  them	  enhance	  their	  children,	  rather	  
than	  just	  prevent	  future	  suffering.	  I	  prefer	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  to	  PB,	  because	  I	  
think	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  let	  parents	  decide	  what	  the	  “best	  life”	  entails.	  The	  danger	  of	  parents	  being	  
given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  decide	  this	  is	  that	  that	  they	  can	  choose	  suffering	  for	  their	  child.	  Why	  
should	  parents	  get	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  think	  suffering	  is	  “best”	  for	  their	  future	  child?	  Yes,	  a	  
person	  can	  grow	  from	  overcoming	  difficult	  obstacles,	  but	  what	  about	  the	  pain	  that	  they	  had	  to	  
endure	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  them?	  There	  is	  already	  enough	  suffering	  for	  people	  to	  endure,	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and	  having	  a	  serious	  disease	  makes	  dealing	  with	  these	  existing	  hardships	  nearly	  impossible.	  
Unnecessary	  suffering	  is	  bad	  for	  well-­‐being	  because	  it	  places	  unneeded	  burdens	  on	  both	  parent	  
and	  child.	  It	  seems	  intrinsic	  to	  us	  as	  humans	  that	  having	  a	  healthy	  child	  is	  more	  important	  than	  
having	  a	  perfect	  one—we	  do	  not	  want	  our	  children,	  or	  anyone	  for	  that	  matter,	  to	  suffer	  
through	  unnecessary	  pain.	  If	  this	  wasn’t	  true,	  why	  would	  doctors	  spend	  so	  much	  time	  trying	  to	  
heal	  sick	  people?	  Why	  would	  scientists	  dedicate	  their	  entire	  lives	  to	  finding	  new	  cures	  for	  
diseases?	  	  	  
Regarding	  the	  first	  advantage	  listed	  above,	  Savulsecu	  and	  Kahane	  attempt	  to	  show	  the	  
advantages	  of	  PB	  over	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  by	  explaining	  that	  PB	  allows	  parents	  to	  
choose	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  “best	  life”.	  They	  explain	  that	  while	  both	  PB	  and	  the	  
Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  would	  instruct	  parents	  to	  select	  children	  that	  are	  less	  disposed	  to	  
depression	  because	  it	  objectively	  makes	  a	  life	  worse,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  manic	  depression.	  
They	  explain	  that	  manic	  depression	  is	  much	  more	  complicated,	  and	  that	  the	  highs	  have	  been	  
linked	  to	  great	  creativity	  and	  productivity.	  They	  write	  that	  The	  Prevention	  of	  Suffering	  View	  
would	  most	  likely	  require	  selecting	  against	  manic	  depression	  because	  of	  how	  low	  the	  lows	  
could	  be,	  giving	  parents	  no	  option	  but	  to	  prevent	  the	  child	  from	  having	  manic	  depression	  (S&K,	  
281-­‐282).	  But	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  they	  are	  admitting	  that	  manic	  depression	  is	  
objectively	  contrary	  to	  well-­‐being.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  because	  some	  people	  with	  manic	  
depression	  endorse	  their	  condition,	  identify	  with	  it,	  and	  can	  live	  successful	  lives,	  “it	  is	  an	  
advantage	  of	  PB	  that	  it	  leaves	  it	  open	  whether	  parents	  have	  reason	  to	  select	  against	  manic	  
depression”	  (S&K,	  282).	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   Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  argue	  that	  manic	  depression	  includes	  suffering	  but	  is	  not	  contrary	  
to	  well-­‐being	  because	  some	  people	  identify	  and	  endorse	  it.	  I	  strongly	  disagree	  with	  Savulescu	  
and	  Kahane’s	  argument	  about	  manic	  depression.	  Statistics	  show	  that	  as	  many	  as	  fifteen	  percent	  
of	  people	  with	  manic	  depression	  will	  die	  by	  their	  own	  hands,	  half	  will	  attempt	  to,	  and	  nearly	  
eighty	  percent	  will	  contemplate	  doing	  so	  (Bloomquist	  1).	  The	  lows	  are	  extremely	  low,	  and	  I	  
don’t	  think	  anyone	  should	  ever	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  mental	  states	  so	  horrible	  if	  they	  can	  be	  
prevented,	  even	  if	  the	  highs	  are	  great.	  People	  can	  be	  creative	  and	  productive	  without	  having	  to	  
endure	  the	  kinds	  of	  suicidal	  depressive	  states	  common	  to	  manic	  depression.	  Savulescu	  and	  
Kahane	  say	  that	  it	  is	  an	  advantage	  of	  PB	  that	  the	  parents	  are	  left	  with	  the	  option	  of	  choosing	  
the	  child	  with	  manic	  depression,	  but	  I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  disadvantage,	  because	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  
that	  parents	  could	  choose	  to	  have	  such	  a	  child,	  and	  that	  child’s	  suffering	  would	  not	  be	  
outweighed	  by	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  condition.	  Besides	  it	  being	  clear	  that	  manic	  depression	  is	  
worse	  for	  overall	  well-­‐being,	  why	  do	  the	  parents	  get	  the	  right	  to	  make	  that	  judgment	  call?	  It	  
seems	  dangerous	  that	  PB	  allows	  parents	  to	  make	  this	  decision—why	  are	  they	  in	  the	  best	  
position	  to	  know?	  
	   In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  written	  about	  and	  discussed	  cases	  relating	  to	  genetic	  engineering,	  a	  
deaf	  lesbian	  couple	  deliberately	  created	  a	  deaf	  child	  by	  using	  sperm	  from	  a	  deaf	  male	  donor	  
(S&K,	  282).	  Many	  might	  feel	  that	  the	  parents’	  decision	  to	  intentionally	  create	  a	  deaf	  child	  is	  
morally	  wrong.	  While	  it	  is	  great	  that	  deaf	  people	  have	  access	  to	  deaf	  communities,	  it	  is	  
extremely	  difficult	  for	  deaf	  people	  to	  communicate	  with	  others	  if	  they	  do	  not	  know	  sign	  
language.	  Verbal	  communication	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  most	  social	  interaction,	  and	  social	  interaction	  
drives	  our	  society.	  It	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  for	  deaf	  people	  to	  secure	  a	  job	  than	  hearing	  people.	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According	  to	  Deaf	  People	  and	  Employment	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  2014	  approximately	  48%	  of	  
deaf	  people	  were	  in	  the	  workforce,	  compared	  to	  72%	  of	  hearing	  people	  (Garberoglio,	  Cawthon	  
&	  Bond,	  1).	  When	  it	  is	  harder	  for	  a	  person	  to	  get	  a	  job,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  will	  live	  in	  
poverty,	  which	  is	  clearly	  contrary	  to	  well-­‐being.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  someone	  to	  argue	  that	  
a	  person	  who	  is	  unable	  to	  afford	  natural	  human	  resources	  such	  as	  water,	  food,	  and	  shelter,	  has	  
a	  good	  overall	  level	  of	  well-­‐being.	  Because	  PB	  allows	  parents	  to	  choose	  what	  is	  considered	  the	  
“best	  life”	  of	  their	  future	  child,	  deliberately	  choosing	  to	  have	  a	  deaf	  child	  would	  not	  go	  against	  
PB.	  Again,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  advantage	  of	  PB	  that	  parents	  have	  the	  option	  to	  have	  a	  deaf	  child	  or	  a	  
child	  with	  manic	  depression.	  How	  could	  it	  be	  an	  advantage	  that	  parents	  have	  the	  option	  to	  
bring	  unnecessary	  suffering	  into	  the	  world?	  
	   Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  would	  respond	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  disabilities	  
such	  as	  deafness	  are	  socially,	  not	  naturally	  imposed.	  They	  believe	  that	  disability	  is	  context	  and	  
person	  relative—that	  “what	  makes	  it	  harder	  to	  lead	  a	  good	  life	  in	  one	  circumstance	  may	  make	  
it	  easier	  in	  another”	  (S&K,	  286).	  Deafness,	  according	  to	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane,	  would	  be	  a	  
positive	  advantage	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  extremely	  loud	  and	  distracting	  noise	  (S&K,	  286).	  The	  
idea	  that	  disabilities	  are	  socially	  imposed	  is	  compatible	  with	  Elizabeth	  Barnes’	  mere-­‐difference	  
view	  of	  disability,	  which	  I	  will	  explain	  in	  detail	  in	  section	  7.	  	  
	   	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  also	  argue	  that	  “parents	  are	  exposing	  children	  to	  risks	  of	  
suffering,	  hardship,	  and	  frustration	  simply	  by	  bringing	  them	  into	  existence.”	  (S&K,	  282).	  They	  
write,	  “if	  procreative	  choices	  were	  constrained	  in	  this	  way,	  there	  could	  be	  strong	  presumptive	  
reasons	  to	  abstain	  from	  procreation	  altogether”	  (S&K,	  282).	  But	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  Prevention	  of	  
Suffering	  View	  is	  to	  prevent	  unnecessary	  serious	  suffering	  and	  loss	  of	  opportunity	  (S&K,	  281).	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Unnecessary	  suffering	  is	  pointless	  suffering—suffering	  that	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  any	  greater	  
good.	  The	  suffering	  that	  parents	  are	  exposing	  children	  to	  by	  bringing	  them	  into	  existence	  is	  not	  
unnecessary—it	  is	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  life.	  Realizing	  that	  some	  of	  your	  friends	  don’t	  actually	  care	  
deeply	  about	  you	  is	  a	  painful	  experience	  full	  of	  suffering,	  but	  it	  is	  necessary	  part	  of	  life.	  Without	  
it,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  find	  true	  friends.	  This	  is	  inherently	  different	  from	  the	  suffering	  a	  
deaf	  person	  experiences—the	  inability	  to	  communicate	  well	  with	  others	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  
greater	  good	  of	  life.	  In	  the	  following	  sections,	  I	  elaborate	  on	  important	  objections	  to	  Savulescu	  
and	  Kahane’s	  view	  that	  we	  should	  create	  the	  children	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  life.	  	  
	  
Section	  6:	  The	  Eugenic	  Objection	  
	   Robert	  Sparrow,	  in	  his	  paper,	  A	  Not-­‐So-­‐New	  Eugenics,	  argues	  against	  Savalescu	  and	  
Kahane’s	  view	  of	  enhancement.	  Sparrow’s	  main	  issue	  with	  their	  argument	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
leads	  to	  conclusions	  that	  are	  even	  scarier	  than	  they	  acknowledge	  in	  their	  paper.	  Sparrow	  thinks	  
that	  if	  the	  world	  were	  to	  function	  as	  PB	  instructs,	  it	  would	  not	  differ	  much	  from	  the	  one	  
eugenicists	  pushed	  for	  in	  the	  past	  (Sparrow	  32).	  His	  main	  argument	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  social	  
factors	  would	  influence	  the	  way	  parents	  would	  choose	  the	  genes	  of	  their	  future	  children.	  
Society	  treats	  white,	  straight	  men	  the	  best,	  and	  if	  parents	  are	  trying	  to	  have	  children	  with	  the	  
best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  life,	  what	  would	  stop	  all	  of	  them	  from	  having	  the	  white,	  straight	  men?	  
Sparrow	  thinks	  PB	  would	  unintentionally	  lead	  to	  a	  eugenic	  world	  because	  of	  this,	  which	  would	  
lead	  to	  discrimination	  against	  non-­‐straight	  white	  men	  becoming	  out	  of	  control	  (Sparrow	  35).	  
	   Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  could	  respond	  that	  PB	  allows	  the	  prospective	  parents	  to	  decide	  
what	  is	  best,	  while	  eugenicists	  were	  the	  ones	  deciding	  what	  was	  best.	  Sparrow	  would	  say	  that	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this	  difference	  doesn’t	  matter	  because	  the	  end	  result	  would	  be	  the	  same.	  While	  not	  enough	  to	  
really	  distinguish	  PB	  from	  eugenics,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  small	  difference	  here—eugenicists	  were	  
deciding	  what	  was	  best	  for	  all	  of	  society	  based	  on	  hatred	  of	  a	  certain	  group,	  while	  parents	  are	  
choosing	  what	  is	  best	  for	  their	  individual	  children.	  This	  makes	  us	  question	  whether	  eugenics	  is	  
wrong	  because	  of	  the	  end	  result	  or	  because	  of	  the	  hatred	  eugenicists	  had	  towards	  the	  groups	  
they	  deemed	  lesser.	  Buchanan,	  Brock,	  Daniels,	  and	  Wikler	  write,	  “parents	  do	  not	  practice	  
eugenics	  when	  they	  seek	  ‘the	  perfect	  baby’.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  these	  parents	  presumably	  do	  
not	  employ	  clinical	  genetics	  with	  the	  population’s	  welfare	  in	  mind”	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  53).	  	  While	  the	  
cumulative	  impact	  of	  these	  parents’	  decisions	  can	  affect	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  others	  and	  society	  
over	  time,	  the	  reason	  parents	  seek	  to	  use	  genetic	  engineering	  technologies	  is	  because	  they	  
want	  their	  child	  to	  be	  advantaged	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  53).	  Parents	  do	  not	  have	  the	  intention	  of	  
removing	  a	  group	  of	  people	  entirely.	  Nevertheless,	  when	  society	  decides	  that	  it	  is	  best	  to	  be	  a	  
white	  straight	  male,	  parents	  will	  notice	  this	  and	  try	  to	  create	  the	  child	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  
the	  best	  life,	  which	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  them	  selecting	  a	  white	  straight	  male.	  So	  while	  the	  
intention	  is	  slightly	  different,	  the	  end	  result	  would	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  old	  eugenics	  because	  the	  
hatred	  of	  non-­‐white	  straight	  males	  could	  evolve	  as	  more	  and	  more	  parents	  select	  white	  straight	  
males.	  Sparrow	  writes,	  “As	  soon	  as	  we	  begin	  sacrificing	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  individuals	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  social	  goals,	  such	  as	  diversity,	  we	  are	  firmly	  back	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  old	  eugenics”	  
(Sparrow	  35-­‐36).	  	  
	   We	  often	  get	  a	  bad	  taste	  in	  our	  mouths	  when	  we	  hear	  the	  word	  eugenics.	  We	  think	  back	  
to	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Nazi	  party	  and	  therefore	  want	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  But	  just	  because	  the	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Nazis	  executed	  their	  eugenic	  goal	  in	  a	  terrible	  way	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  eugenics	  is	  always	  
wrong.	  Brock,	  Daniels,	  and	  Wikler	  write,	  	  
Reflexive	  rejection	  of	  eugenic	  ideas	  because	  they	  had	  unsavory	  advocates	  is	  neither	  
morally	  nor	  intellectually	  serious.	  What	  matters	  is	  the	  moral	  defensibility	  of	  the	  eugenic	  
concepts	  and	  values	  themselves,	  which	  must	  be	  identified	  and	  assessed	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  45-­‐
46).	  	  
	  
They	  explain	  that	  the	  core	  belief	  common	  to	  all	  eugenicists	  was	  concern	  for	  human	  betterment	  
through	  selection.	  Eugenicists	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  humans	  who	  come	  into	  existence	  in	  
the	  future	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  enjoying	  better	  lives	  and	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  betterment	  of	  lives	  
of	  others,	  a	  goal	  that	  is	  not	  so	  difficult	  to	  get	  behind.	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  42).	  Through	  a	  deep	  analysis	  
of	  eugenics,	  they	  find	  that	  much	  of	  the	  bad	  reputation	  of	  eugenics	  “is	  traceable	  to	  attributes	  
that,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  might	  be	  avoidable	  in	  a	  future	  eugenics	  program”	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  43).	  The	  
main	  issue	  with	  the	  old	  eugenics	  was	  the	  way	  it	  was	  implemented	  rather	  than	  its	  moral	  
foundation.	  But,	  they	  still	  believe	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  social	  justice	  and	  fairness	  that	  reduced	  
the	  moral	  stature	  of	  eugenics	  previously	  will	  be	  just	  as	  difficult	  in	  the	  future	  decades	  (B,	  B,	  
D&W,	  43).	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  those	  that	  are	  genetically	  healthier	  can	  exclude	  others	  
and	  even	  profit	  from	  doing	  so.	  They	  explain	  that	  ignorance	  of	  genetic	  differences	  provides	  a	  
sense	  of	  common	  fate,	  and	  that	  genetic	  interventions	  can	  threaten	  that	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  59).	  Thus,	  
even	  though	  the	  eugenic	  goal	  was	  not	  so	  terrible	  in	  its	  nature,	  we	  should	  still	  try	  to	  avoid	  a	  
eugenic	  future	  because	  of	  the	  reasons	  Sparrow	  suggests.	  We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  live	  in	  a	  world	  
where	  parents	  are	  pressured	  to	  have	  straight,	  white,	  sons.	  If	  we	  did,	  it	  would	  be	  even	  more	  
difficult	  than	  it	  is	  today	  for	  non-­‐straight	  white	  males	  to	  be	  treated	  fairly	  and	  succeed	  in	  society.	  	  
	   Sparrow	  explains	  that	  consequentialism,	  the	  view	  that	  we	  should	  minimize	  the	  amount	  
of	  unnecessary	  suffering	  in	  the	  world	  and	  is	  prominent	  in	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane’s	  paper,	  would	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tell	  us	  to	  use	  PGD	  (pre-­‐implantation	  genetic	  diagnosis)	  to	  prevent	  the	  birth	  of	  children	  with	  
severe	  disabilities.	  It	  would	  also	  imply	  that	  “we	  should	  select	  a	  healthy	  child	  for	  the	  same	  
reason	  we	  would	  act	  to	  prevent	  harm	  to	  an	  existing	  child—in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  amount	  of	  
unnecessary	  suffering	  in	  the	  world”	  (Sparrow	  34).	  He	  writes	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  not	  to	  
think	  that	  parents	  do	  something	  wrong	  if	  they	  are	  offered	  the	  choice	  to	  use	  PGD	  to	  identify	  and	  
select	  against	  embryos	  suffering	  from	  a	  serious	  genetic	  disorder	  and	  choose	  not	  to	  do	  so	  
(Sparrow	  34).	  But	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  avoiding	  disease	  and	  pursuing	  eugenic	  aims	  
(Sparrow	  34).	  The	  consequentialist	  view	  that	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  endorse	  has	  terrifying	  
eugenic	  consequences.	  	  
	   Sparrow	  explains	  that	  because	  the	  prospects	  for	  an	  individual’s	  flourishing	  is	  a	  function	  
of	  interaction	  between	  genes	  and	  environment,	  advocates	  for	  genetic	  enhancement	  argue	  that	  
our	  obligation	  to	  manipulate	  certain	  genes	  is	  the	  same	  as	  our	  obligation	  to	  manipulate	  the	  
environment	  and	  arises	  “out	  of	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  implications	  of	  our	  child’s	  phenotype	  for	  his	  
or	  her	  welfare”	  (Sparrow	  35).	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane’s	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  
are	  creating	  comfortable	  environments	  for	  our	  children	  already,	  so	  why	  shouldn’t	  we	  be	  able	  to	  
choose	  which	  genes	  are	  best	  for	  our	  children?	  (S&K,	  276-­‐277).	  But	  when	  thinking	  about	  
environmental	  factors	  that	  will	  impact	  our	  future	  children,	  we	  mustn’t	  forget	  social	  factors	  such	  
as	  racism	  and	  sexism	  (Sparrow	  35).	  Many	  times	  social	  factors	  such	  as	  these	  have	  a	  much	  
greater	  effect	  on	  children	  than	  other	  environmental	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  financial	  stability	  of	  the	  
family.	  So	  if	  parents	  are	  trying	  to	  create	  the	  children	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  lives	  and	  
they	  think	  that	  both	  genes	  and	  environment	  matter,	  it	  follows	  that	  they	  would	  take	  these	  social	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factors	  into	  account	  (Sparrow	  35).	  Taking	  these	  social	  factors	  into	  account	  when	  using	  genetic	  
engineering	  technology	  can	  lead	  to	  eugenic	  aims.	  	  
	   If	  parents	  are	  trying	  to	  choose	  the	  child	  with	  the	  best	  possible	  life,	  and	  the	  world	  that	  
child	  will	  be	  born	  into	  is	  a	  racist	  one,	  it	  would	  follow	  from	  PB	  that	  the	  parents	  should	  choose	  
the	  child	  that	  is	  least	  likely	  to	  discriminated	  against	  due	  to	  their	  race.	  It	  would	  also	  follow	  that	  
the	  parents	  would	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  choose	  a	  male	  over	  a	  female,	  because	  in	  many	  societies	  
men	  are	  prioritized	  over	  women.	  Sparrow	  writes	  that	  based	  on	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane’s	  
argument,	  the	  overarching	  population	  of	  Europe,	  North	  America,	  and	  Australia,	  would	  be	  
straight,	  tall,	  white	  men	  (Sparrow	  35).	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  PB	  opens	  up	  
space	  for	  diversity,	  but	  when	  analyzed	  more	  deeply,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  “the	  logic	  of	  a	  
concern	  with	  improving	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  future	  persons	  points	  toward	  quite	  a	  different	  
conclusion-­‐that,	  in	  any	  given	  environment	  at	  least,	  there	  is	  a	  "best"	  genome,	  which	  parents	  are	  
obligated	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  children”	  (Sparrow	  36).	  	  
	   While	  my	  view	  that	  we	  should	  avoid	  unnecessary	  suffering	  runs	  into	  the	  same	  “best”	  
genome	  problem,	  my	  “best”	  genome	  would	  be	  based	  on	  the	  healthiest	  genome,	  not	  on	  the	  
genome	  that	  would	  fit	  the	  best	  in	  the	  current	  social	  environment.	  My	  view	  about	  avoiding	  
unnecessary	  suffering	  is	  based	  around	  health	  because	  a	  base	  level	  of	  health	  is	  not	  directly	  
related	  to	  the	  current	  social	  climate.	  My	  “best”	  genome	  would	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
given	  environment,	  unlike	  the	  potential	  “best”	  genome	  Sparrow	  describes.	  Designing	  children	  
based	  on	  what	  would	  “fit”	  in	  the	  world	  is	  different	  than	  choosing	  the	  healthiest	  children.	  Rivka	  
Weinberg,	  in	  her	  article,	  What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Selecting	  for	  Maleness	  or	  White	  Skin,	  argues	  that	  
while	  having	  a	  trait	  that	  people	  discriminate	  against	  such	  as	  black	  skin	  can	  be	  difficult,	  this	  is	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only	  because	  of	  the	  already	  prevalent	  racist	  ideas	  in	  society,	  not	  because	  of	  the	  trait	  itself.	  She	  
writes	  that	  we	  should	  target	  sexism	  and	  racism	  rather	  than	  perpetuating	  it	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
PGD	  or	  other	  genetic	  technologies,	  because	  “being	  sexist	  or	  racist	  is	  wrong,	  and	  moreover,	  
perpetuating	  or	  participating	  in	  bigotry	  is	  bad	  for	  everyone	  (Weinberg,	  1).	  I	  fully	  agree	  with	  
Weinberg’s	  point.	  Using	  genetic	  technologies	  to	  have	  babies	  that	  are	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  be	  
discriminated	  against	  is	  like	  taking	  Advil	  for	  chronic	  migraines-­‐-­‐	  a	  temporary	  solution	  that	  does	  
not	  target	  the	  real	  problem.	  The	  real	  problem	  is	  our	  racist	  and	  sexist	  society,	  not	  the	  traits	  our	  
society	  targets.	  	  	  	  
	   If	  genetic	  enhancement	  technologies	  become	  readily	  available,	  then	  parents	  will	  likely	  
feel	  intense	  pressures	  to	  use	  them,	  because	  if	  they	  don’t,	  their	  children	  will	  inevitably	  be	  
considered	  worse	  than	  the	  children	  that	  were	  genetically	  enhanced	  (Sparrow	  40).	  Besides	  the	  
fact	  that	  some	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  the	  technology,	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  parents	  
could	  decide	  that	  the	  “best”	  for	  their	  child	  would	  be	  to	  not	  interfere	  with	  their	  genes	  at	  all.	  We	  
could	  see	  parents	  making	  that	  decision	  in	  today’s	  society,	  but	  in	  a	  society	  where	  most	  others	  
are	  genetically	  enhanced,	  would	  those	  parents	  still	  be	  able	  to	  make	  that	  decision?	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  
seems	  that	  while	  PB	  presents	  itself	  as	  allowing	  parents	  to	  choose	  what	  is	  considered	  the	  best	  
life,	  it	  does	  so	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  world	  that	  PB	  would	  create.	  If	  a	  PB	  based	  society	  would	  
look	  down	  upon	  parents	  that	  think	  that	  the	  best	  life	  for	  their	  child	  would	  be	  one	  free	  of	  genetic	  
enhancements,	  would	  these	  parents	  really	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  that	  route?	  
	   I	  think	  that	  in	  a	  genetic	  enhancement	  friendly	  world,	  the	  parents	  that	  are	  pro-­‐
enhancement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  enhanced	  children	  could	  bound	  together	  to	  form	  a	  group	  of	  people	  
who	  do	  not	  just	  think	  they	  are	  better	  than	  everyone	  else,	  but	  genetically	  are.	  This	  could	  be	  even	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worse	  than	  the	  old	  eugenics,	  in	  which	  case	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Nazis	  thought	  they	  were	  better	  
than	  others	  for	  no	  real,	  scientific	  reason.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  if	  genetic	  enhancement	  technologies	  
became	  readily	  available,	  the	  idea	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  “normal”	  will	  shift	  towards	  a	  
genetically	  enhanced	  human.	  If	  this	  happens,	  those	  that	  are	  genetically	  enhanced	  could	  
consider	  those	  that	  are	  not	  to	  be	  almost	  disabled.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  society,	  the	  genetically	  
enhanced	  people	  could	  be	  inclined	  to	  remove	  the	  non	  genetically	  enhanced	  people	  from	  the	  
world	  entirely.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  new	  eugenics	  could	  lead	  to	  consequences	  similar	  to	  
the	  old.	  	  	  	  
	  
Section	  7:	  The	  Disability	  Objection	  
	   Elizabeth	  Barnes,	  in	  her	  paper,	  Valuing	  Disability,	  Causing	  Disability,	  presents	  some	  
objections	  to	  Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  by	  explaining	  the	  “mere-­‐difference”	  view	  of	  disability	  
(Barnes,	  89-­‐90).	  Barnes	  explains	  that	  a	  “bad-­‐difference”	  view	  of	  disability	  states	  that	  disability	  
on	  its	  own	  is	  something	  that	  makes	  you	  worse-­‐off	  even	  if	  society	  was	  fully	  accommodating	  of	  
disabled	  people,	  and	  that	  the	  “mere-­‐difference”	  view	  denies	  this	  (Barnes,	  89).	  	  According	  to	  the	  
mere-­‐difference	  view	  of	  disability,	  having	  a	  disability	  makes	  you	  different,	  but	  doesn’t	  by	  itself	  
make	  you	  worse	  off	  overall	  (Barnes,	  89).	  She	  believes	  the	  only	  reason	  people	  with	  disabilities	  
are	  worse-­‐off	  than	  non-­‐disabled	  people	  is	  because	  of	  the	  way	  society	  treats	  them	  (Barnes,	  90).	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  according	  to	  the	  mere-­‐difference	  view,	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  
disabled	  people	  is	  usually	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  nondisabled	  because	  of	  the	  way	  society	  treats	  
disabled	  people,	  not	  because	  disability	  is	  intrinsically	  bad	  (Barnes	  90).	  According	  to	  the	  mere-­‐
difference	  view,	  disability	  cannot	  be	  considered	  a	  loss	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  something,	  because	  while	  a	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disability	  causes	  you	  to	  lose	  out	  on	  some	  goods	  that	  nondisabled	  people	  have,	  it	  also	  allows	  you	  
to	  participate	  in	  other	  goods	  that	  nondisabled	  people	  cannot	  have	  access	  to	  (Barnes,	  90).	  
Barnes	  explains:	  	  
A	  defender	  of	  the	  mere-­‐difference	  view	  can	  grant	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  hear	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  
good.	  And	  it	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  good	  that	  Deaf	  people	  lack.	  But	  there	  might	  be	  other	  intrinsic	  
goods—the	  unique	  experience	  of	  language	  had	  by	  those	  whose	  first	  language	  is	  a	  signed	  
rather	  than	  spoken	  language,	  the	  experience	  of	  music	  via	  vibrations,	  and	  so	  on—
experienced	  by	  Deaf	  people	  and	  not	  by	  hearing	  people.	  Deafness	  can	  involve	  the	  lack	  of	  
an	  intrinsic	  good	  without	  being	  merely	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  intrinsic	  good	  (Barnes	  90).	  
	   	  
Barnes	  brings	  up	  an	  interesting	  point	  here.	  Why	  do	  many	  people	  consider	  a	  person	  who	  is	  
nondisabled	  to	  be	  objectively	  better	  off	  than	  a	  person	  who	  is	  disabled?	  
While	  this	  is	  a	  thought	  provoking	  argument,	  I	  have	  to	  disagree.	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  
goods	  that	  disabled	  people	  have	  access	  to	  that	  nondisabled	  people	  do	  not,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  
that	  in	  this	  case	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  weigh	  goods	  in	  relation	  to	  disability	  like	  this.	  A	  disability	  is	  
something	  that	  takes	  away.	  Disabilities	  cause	  people	  pain	  and	  difficulty.	  Yes,	  disabled	  people	  
have	  access	  to	  certain	  goods	  that	  nondisabled	  people	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  and	  those	  goods	  
are	  clearly	  unique	  and	  wonderful.	  But	  there	  are	  so	  many	  unique	  and	  wonderful	  goods	  that	  non	  
disabled	  people	  have	  access	  to	  that	  disabled	  people	  do	  not.	  The	  difference	  is,	  non-­‐disabled	  
people	  do	  not	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  pain	  that	  certain	  disabilities	  come	  with,	  which	  I	  think	  
makes	  them	  better	  off	  from	  the	  day	  they	  are	  born.	  A	  blind	  person	  could	  recount	  how	  amazing	  it	  
has	  been	  to	  have	  a	  blind	  community	  provide	  them	  with	  support,	  but	  a	  non-­‐blind	  person	  could	  
talk	  about	  how	  amazing	  it	  is	  to	  have	  some	  other	  community	  they	  are	  a	  part	  of	  provide	  them	  
with	  support,	  as	  well	  as	  talk	  about	  how	  amazing	  it	  is	  to	  see	  color.	  There	  is	  an	  infinite	  amount	  of	  
good	  a	  person	  can	  have	  in	  their	  lives.	  While	  we	  could	  say	  the	  same	  about	  pain,	  I	  think	  in	  this	  
case,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  blind	  person	  experiences	  more	  pain,	  while	  maybe	  not	  direct	  physical	  pain,	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than	  a	  non-­‐blind	  person.	  Lacking	  the	  natural	  human	  ability	  to	  see	  poses	  great	  challenges	  to	  
living	  a	  life	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  in	  ways	  that	  being	  sighted	  does	  not.	  When	  a	  person	  is	  blind,	  
they	  are	  unable	  to	  drive,	  have	  a	  harder	  time	  doing	  every-­‐day	  tasks	  like	  cooking,	  and	  have	  a	  
much	  harder	  time	  communicating	  with	  others.	  People	  often	  communicate	  through	  their	  body	  
language,	  and	  a	  blind	  person	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  recognize	  important	  bodily	  signals.	  In	  my	  
view,	  people	  with	  significant	  limiting	  or	  painful	  disabilities	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  other	  goods	  to	  
make	  up	  for	  the	  goods	  that	  their	  disability	  causes	  them	  to	  lose.	  	  
Besides	  the	  fact	  that	  disabled	  people	  have	  a	  more	  difficult	  time	  in	  their	  every-­‐day	  lives,	  
when	  we	  look	  at	  cures	  and	  treatments	  being	  offered	  to	  disabled	  people,	  we	  notice	  that	  almost	  
all	  with	  conditions	  that	  are	  able	  to	  be	  cured	  or	  treated	  are	  more	  than	  happy	  to	  accept	  them.	  
This	  shows	  that	  while	  some	  disabled	  people	  are	  completely	  fine	  with	  their	  condition,	  many	  if	  
not	  most	  would	  willingly	  choose	  to	  live	  without	  it.	  	  
Followers	  of	  the	  mere-­‐difference	  view	  would	  object	  to	  me	  here	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  
reason	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  be	  disabled	  than	  it	  is	  to	  be	  nondisabled	  is	  because	  the	  society	  we	  live	  in	  is	  
not	  accommodating	  to	  disabled	  people.	  Let’s	  say	  this	  wasn’t	  true,	  and	  somehow	  society	  was	  
accommodating	  to	  every	  single	  type	  of	  disability	  that	  existed.	  First	  of	  all,	  this	  seems	  quite	  
impossible.	  There	  are	  too	  many	  different	  kinds	  of	  disabilities	  in	  the	  world	  for	  there	  to	  be	  any	  
way	  to	  set	  up	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  every	  single	  disabled	  person	  was	  accommodated	  for.	  
There	  are	  some	  disabilities	  such	  as	  chronic	  heart	  problems	  that	  society	  would	  have	  a	  difficult	  or	  
impossible	  time	  accommodating.	  But,	  if	  it	  was	  possible,	  according	  to	  the	  mere-­‐difference	  view,	  
the	  playing	  field	  between	  disabled	  people	  and	  nondisabled	  people	  would	  be	  close	  enough	  that	  
it	  would	  not	  matter	  very	  much	  (Barnes	  90).	  But	  would	  that	  really	  be	  the	  case?	  Can	  we	  really	  say	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that	  if	  society	  was	  accommodating	  to	  someone	  with	  a	  limp,	  then	  people	  with	  limps	  would	  be	  no	  
worse	  off	  than	  people	  without	  them?	  Having	  a	  heart	  disease	  that	  causes	  multiple	  heart	  attacks	  
is	  uncomfortable,	  on	  its	  own.	  Having	  constant	  back	  pain	  that	  prevents	  you	  from	  handling	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	  activities	  is	  is	  difficult,	  on	  its	  own.	  It	  seems	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  set	  up	  society	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  could	  accommodate	  for	  everybody’s	  own	  physical	  pain.	  What	  could	  we	  immediately	  do	  
besides	  have	  the	  person	  with	  back	  pain	  check	  into	  the	  hospital	  and	  get	  treated?	  
	   Barnes	  tells	  us	  to	  imagine	  a	  case	  in	  which	  a	  child	  will	  100%	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  gay,	  and	  the	  
parents	  have	  the	  option	  of	  making	  the	  child	  straight	  instead,	  because	  being	  gay	  is	  a	  greater	  
challenge	  to	  well-­‐being	  than	  being	  straight.	  It	  is	  undoubtedly	  more	  difficult	  to	  be	  gay	  than	  
straight	  in	  today’s	  society,	  so	  the	  parents	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  make	  the	  change.	  Barnes	  
explains	  that	  while	  any	  gay	  child	  will	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  homophobia	  and	  any	  disabled	  person	  
will	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  ableism,	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  gay	  child	  can	  take	  steps	  to	  mediate	  the	  bad	  
effects	  of	  homophobia.	  The	  parents	  of	  the	  gay	  child	  can	  do	  anything	  in	  their	  power	  to	  raise	  the	  
child	  in	  a	  homophobia-­‐free	  environment.	  While	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  disabled	  child	  can	  try	  to	  do	  
the	  same,	  it	  would	  be	  harder,	  because	  “in	  the	  case	  of	  disabilities	  the	  issues	  facing	  their	  child	  will	  
be	  access	  to	  basic	  services	  and	  navigation	  of	  basic	  social	  interaction”	  (Barnes	  102).	  Barnes	  
further	  writes,	  “there	  is	  a	  limited	  amount	  that	  individual	  parents	  can	  do	  to	  mediate	  this.	  They	  
can	  tell	  their	  child	  that	  she’s	  valued	  just	  the	  way	  she	  is,	  but	  they	  can’t	  make	  buildings	  accessible	  
and	  they	  can’t	  make	  people	  less	  awkward	  around	  her”	  (Barnes	  102).	  
	   Making	  a	  gay	  child	  straight	  before	  they	  are	  born	  would,	  in	  today’s	  society,	  be	  considered	  
to	  be	  homophobic.	  Barnes	  questions	  why	  this	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  wrong	  by	  people	  but	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making	  a	  disabled	  child	  nondisabled	  would	  not	  be.	  Both	  having	  a	  disability	  and	  being	  gay	  lessen	  
a	  person’s	  overall	  level	  of	  well-­‐being	  (because	  of	  the	  way	  society	  treats	  them).	  	  
	   Barnes	  is	  right	  about	  one	  thing—one	  reason	  a	  gay	  person’s	  life	  is	  harder	  than	  a	  straight	  
person’s	  life	  is	  because	  of	  the	  way	  society	  treats	  gay	  people.	  In	  relation	  to	  homosexuality,	  
society	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  makes	  a	  gay	  person’s	  life	  worse	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been	  if	  they	  
were	  straight.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  disabled	  people.	  Disabled	  people	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  both	  
the	  pain	  and	  inconvenience	  of	  their	  disability	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  society	  treats	  them	  because	  of	  
it.	  In	  relation	  to	  disabilities,	  there	  is	  both	  a	  natural	  component	  and	  a	  social	  component.	  In	  
relation	  to	  homosexuality,	  there	  is	  only	  a	  social	  one.	  Even	  if	  society	  were	  to	  be	  perfect,	  it	  would	  
still	  be	  difficult	  for	  someone	  in	  a	  wheelchair	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  can’t	  run	  anymore.	  
	  	  
Section	  8:	  ‘Life	  is	  a	  Gift’	  Objection	  	  	  
	   Savulescu	  and	  Kahane	  argue	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  and	  encourage	  parents	  to	  do	  what	  they	  
can	  to	  improve	  their	  children’s'	  lives	  and	  prospects,	  then	  we	  should	  similarly	  accept	  genetic	  
enhancements	  (S&K,	  276-­‐277).	  Sandel	  explains	  that	  while	  this	  is	  true,	  there	  isn’t	  that	  much	  of	  a	  
difference	  between	  wanting	  to	  improve	  your	  child’s	  life	  in	  a	  genetic	  enhancement	  or	  non-­‐
genetic-­‐enhancement	  way,	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  is	  a	  different	  one.	  Sandel	  believes	  that	  
performance-­‐enhancing	  technologies,	  genetic	  or	  otherwise,	  “animate	  the	  impulse	  to	  rail	  
against	  the	  given”	  (Sandel	  61).	  By	  ‘the	  given,’	  Sandel	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  way	  people	  come	  into	  
the	  world,	  especially	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  child	  comes	  to	  its	  parents	  as	  a	  given,	  with	  traits	  that	  
are	  not	  directly	  chosen.	  He	  admits	  that	  while	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  bioengineering	  is	  similar	  to	  
other	  ways	  parents	  shape	  their	  children	  have	  a	  point,	  this	  gives	  us	  a	  reason	  to	  question	  rather	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than	  accept	  and	  move	  forward	  with	  these	  intense	  child-­‐rearing	  practices.	  By	  accepting	  these	  
practices,	  we	  forget	  to	  treat	  the	  sense	  of	  life	  as	  a	  gift.	  He	  believes	  this	  to	  be	  the	  deepest	  source	  
of	  the	  moral	  trouble	  with	  enhancement.	  (Sandel	  61).	  
	   The	  first	  way	  Sandel	  explains	  this	  is	  through	  athletics.	  He	  explains	  that	  while	  effort	  and	  
hard	  work	  is	  important	  in	  sports,	  natural	  talents	  and	  gifts	  are	  important	  as	  well.	  He	  writes,	  	  
The	  real	  problem	  with	  genetically	  altered	  athletes	  is	  that	  they	  corrupt	  athletic	  
competition	  as	  a	  human	  activity	  that	  honors	  the	  cultivation	  and	  display	  of	  natural	  
talents.	  From	  this	  standpoint,	  enhancement	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ultimate	  expression	  of	  
the	  ethic	  of	  effort	  and	  willfulness,	  a	  kind	  of	  high-­‐tech	  striving.	  The	  ethic	  of	  willfulness	  
and	  the	  biotechnological	  powers	  it	  now	  enlists	  are	  both	  arrayed	  against	  the	  claims	  of	  
giftedness.	  (Sandel	  29).	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  components	  to	  being	  good	  at	  a	  sport—natural	  talent,	  and	  the	  effort	  that	  
one	  puts	  in.	  Sandel’s	  problem	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  technologies	  to	  improve	  athletic	  ability	  stems	  
from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  add	  a	  new	  level	  to	  the	  effort	  part	  of	  the	  equation.	  It	  could	  become	  
the	  case	  that	  people	  see	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  technology	  as	  what	  he	  describes	  as	  “the	  ultimate	  
expression	  of	  the	  ethic	  of	  effort	  and	  willfulness”	  (Sandel	  29).	  Adding	  another	  layer	  to	  the	  ethic	  
of	  effort	  and	  willfulness	  would	  fight	  even	  harder	  against	  giftedness,	  which	  he	  finds	  to	  be	  a	  
problem.	  While	  it	  could	  appear	  that	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  enhancement	  technology	  is	  the	  ultimate	  
act	  of	  hard	  work—I	  see	  it	  as	  the	  opposite.	  Access	  to	  genetic	  technologies	  would	  depend	  mostly	  
on	  one’s	  financial	  status,	  and	  while	  there	  are	  some	  who	  have	  worked	  hard	  for	  their	  wealth,	  
there	  are	  many	  who	  haven’t.	  While	  financial	  status	  can	  be	  directly	  relevant	  to	  a	  person’s	  
success	  in	  sports	  (players	  can	  train	  more	  if	  their	  parents	  have	  more	  money),	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  
financial	  status	  should	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  hard	  work	  aspect	  of	  sports.	  	  
Sandel	  writes	  that	  if	  on	  top	  of	  attempting	  to	  improve	  performance	  through	  steroids,	  
special	  diets,	  and	  other	  rigorous	  training	  regimes,	  athletes	  had	  access	  to	  genetic	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enhancements,	  our	  idea	  of	  sports	  will	  completely	  change	  (Sandel	  36).	  If	  watching	  sports	  simply	  
entailed	  watching	  athletes	  do	  everything	  almost	  perfectly,	  people	  would	  no	  longer	  find	  sports	  
that	  interesting	  to	  watch.	  He	  thinks	  that	  the	  entertainment	  part	  of	  watching	  sports	  stems	  from	  
the	  drama	  of	  seeing	  even	  the	  best	  of	  players	  make	  mistakes	  (Sandel	  36).	  If	  this	  is	  taken	  away,	  
which	  it	  would	  be	  everyone	  started	  using	  genetic	  enhancement	  technologies,	  Sandel	  believes	  
that	  sports	  would	  merely	  become	  a	  spectacle	  (Sandel	  36).	  Of	  course,	  players	  would	  still	  make	  
some	  mistakes,	  but	  they	  would	  be	  few	  and	  far	  between.	  Sandel	  explains	  that	  spectacles	  
“depreciate	  the	  natural	  talents	  and	  gifts	  that	  the	  greatest	  players	  display”	  (Sandel	  36).	  In	  
response	  to	  Sandel,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  players	  will	  continue	  to	  make	  mistakes,	  just	  at	  a	  higher	  
level	  of	  play	  and	  with	  greater	  skill.	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  in	  a	  sport	  such	  as	  basketball	  in	  which	  
players	  are	  competing	  against	  each	  other	  players	  would	  make	  only	  few	  mistakes.	  Would	  
genetic	  engineering	  technologies	  really	  change	  sports	  that	  much	  in	  the	  way	  he	  describes?	  Or	  
would	  the	  average	  level	  of	  players	  simply	  increase?	  The	  bigger	  issue	  to	  me	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  
only	  some	  would	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  these	  technologies.	  	  	  
Sandel	  argues	  that	  genetic	  enhancements	  would	  change	  any	  type	  of	  performances	  
entirely.	  If	  viewers	  are	  watching	  because	  of	  the	  attention	  grabbing	  feature	  of	  a	  sport,	  they	  
would	  be	  watching	  simply	  to	  get	  immediate	  pleasure,	  and	  would	  no	  longer	  recognize	  natural	  
gifts	  and	  talents.	  Sandel’s	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  natural	  gifts	  and	  talents	  that	  exist	  
must	  be	  recognized.	  He	  writes,	  “If	  bioengineering	  made	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  ‘self-­‐made	  man’	  come	  
true,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  view	  our	  talents	  as	  gifts	  for	  which	  we	  are	  indebted	  rather	  than	  
achievements	  for	  which	  we	  are	  responsible”	  (Sandel	  86).	  Parents	  would	  become	  responsible	  for	  
choosing	  or	  failing	  to	  choose	  the	  ‘right’	  traits	  for	  their	  children.	  He	  explains	  that	  if	  a	  basketball	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player	  misses	  a	  rebound	  today,	  his	  coach	  can	  blame	  him	  for	  being	  out	  of	  position,	  while	  in	  a	  
world	  where	  genetic	  enhancements	  were	  readily	  available,	  his	  coach	  can	  blame	  him	  for	  being	  
too	  short	  (Sandel	  87).	  	  
	   When	  natural	  ability	  in	  sports	  is	  depreciated,	  the	  sport	  is	  depreciated	  as	  well.	  Let’s	  say	  
there	  are	  two	  people	  on	  the	  basketball	  court,	  Michael	  Jordan	  and	  a	  genetically	  engineered	  
player,	  who	  would	  be	  solely	  average	  if	  he	  was	  not	  genetically	  engineered.	  Both	  players	  make	  
the	  exact	  same	  number	  of	  hoops	  in	  the	  game.	  Based	  on	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  the	  genetically	  
engineered	  player	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  just	  as	  good	  as	  Michael	  Jordan.	  But	  can	  we	  really	  say	  this	  is	  
the	  case?	  If	  without	  genetic	  technology	  the	  other	  player	  would	  just	  have	  been	  average	  at	  
basketball,	  how	  can	  we	  really	  believe	  the	  two	  players	  deserve	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  respect	  and	  
appreciation?	  
	   One	  could	  respond	  to	  me	  by	  arguing	  that	  a	  parent’s	  decision	  to	  make	  their	  future	  child	  
incredible	  at	  basketball	  is	  not	  much	  different	  than	  a	  person	  being	  naturally	  born	  incredible	  at	  
basketball.	  People	  are	  born	  with	  natural	  abilities	  that	  give	  them	  unfair	  advantages	  all	  the	  time,	  
so	  why	  can’t	  we	  intentionally	  create	  these	  abilities	  ourselves?	  This	  is	  a	  valid	  response,	  but	  I	  
believe	  that	  a	  genuine	  and	  natural	  ability	  is	  more	  truthful	  in	  its	  nature,	  and	  thus	  deserves	  more	  
appreciation.	  The	  reason	  it	  seems	  more	  truthful	  in	  its	  nature	  is	  because	  a	  parent	  creating	  an	  
ability	  for	  their	  future	  child	  is	  an	  intentional	  action,	  and	  therefore	  seems	  superficial.	  This	  action	  
that	  the	  parents	  take	  to	  give	  this	  ability	  to	  their	  future	  child	  will	  cost	  money,	  and	  will	  likely	  not	  
be	  available	  to	  everyone.	  While	  the	  natural	  lottery	  of	  abilities	  is	  random	  and	  seems	  unfair,	  it	  
cannot	  be	  as	  unfair	  as	  certain	  people	  having	  access	  to	  changing	  their	  future	  children’s	  abilities	  
due	  to	  their	  financial	  or	  any	  other	  status.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  appreciate	  a	  great	  basketball	  player	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knowing	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  been	  so	  great	  if	  his	  parents	  did	  not	  pay	  to	  alter	  his	  DNA	  before	  
he	  was	  born.	  	  
Sandel	  takes	  his	  argument	  further	  by	  relating	  it	  to	  education	  and	  the	  pressures	  that	  
parents	  put	  on	  their	  children	  to	  succeed	  academically.	  Sandel	  admits	  that	  improving	  children	  
through	  genetic	  enhancement	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  high-­‐pressure	  and	  overly	  controlling	  practices	  
relating	  to	  hyper-­‐parenting	  that	  already	  exist	  such	  as	  parents	  writing	  their	  children’s	  college	  
applications,	  phoning	  to	  badger	  the	  admissions	  office,	  and	  staying	  overnight	  in	  college	  dorm	  
rooms	  (Sandel	  54).	  Parents	  are	  already	  trying	  to	  make	  their	  children	  perfect	  in	  every	  way	  they	  
can,	  putting	  way	  too	  much	  pressure	  on	  them.	  If	  parents	  have	  access	  to	  genetic	  enhancements	  
technologies,	  they	  will	  take	  their	  hyper-­‐parenting	  even	  farther	  by	  trying	  to	  create	  children	  with	  
perfect	  genetic	  codes.	  When	  parents	  try	  to	  make	  their	  children	  perfect,	  they	  spend	  too	  much	  
time	  trying	  to	  improve	  them	  in	  every	  way	  possible	  and	  less	  time	  accepting,	  loving,	  and	  spending	  
time	  with	  them.	  Sandel	  explains	  that	  this	  similarity	  doesn’t	  vindicate	  genetic	  enhancement,	  but	  
rather	  “highlights	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  trend	  toward	  hyper	  parenting”	  (Sandel	  52).	  	  	  
	   Hyper	  parenting	  appears	  to	  be	  its	  own	  extreme	  sport.	  College	  administrators	  are	  coming	  
forward	  about	  how	  much	  of	  a	  problem	  parents	  wanting	  to	  control	  their	  children’s	  college	  lives	  
has	  become.	  Educational	  psychologists	  report	  that	  growing	  numbers	  of	  parents	  will	  do	  anything	  
to	  have	  their	  high	  school	  junior	  or	  senior	  diagnosed	  with	  a	  learning	  disability	  such	  as	  ADHD	  for	  
reasons	  such	  as	  getting	  more	  time	  on	  the	  SAT	  (Sandel	  54-­‐55).	  	  
	   As	  getting	  into	  and	  succeeding	  at	  the	  most	  prestigious	  colleges	  becomes	  more	  and	  more	  
competitive,	  some	  students	  will	  do	  anything	  to	  get	  to	  the	  top.	  Sandel	  notes,	  “Over	  the	  past	  
fifteen	  years,	  the	  legal	  production	  of	  Ritalin	  increased	  by	  1,700	  percent,	  and	  the	  production	  of	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the	  amphetamine	  Adderall,	  also	  marketed	  for	  treatment	  of	  ADHD,	  rose	  3,000	  percent”	  (Sandel	  
59).	  These	  drugs	  are	  not	  just	  being	  prescribed	  to	  high	  school	  students.	  Prescription	  rates	  for	  
two-­‐	  to	  four-­‐year	  old	  children	  nearly	  tripled	  from	  1991	  to	  1995,	  Sandel	  writes	  (Sandel	  60).	  
These	  extreme	  pressures	  caused	  by	  parental	  misconceptions	  of	  reality	  that	  are	  evolving	  in	  
American	  life	  are	  changing	  expectations	  that	  parents	  have	  for	  their	  children,	  as	  well	  as	  
increasing	  the	  demands	  that	  are	  placed	  on	  children	  to	  be	  the	  best	  (Sandel	  58).	  The	  accessibility	  
of	  genetic	  enhancements	  would	  make	  hyper-­‐parenting	  worse	  than	  it	  already	  is	  because	  
expectations	  of	  children	  would	  be	  even	  higher	  if	  parents	  took	  the	  time	  and	  spent	  the	  money	  to	  
genetically	  enhance	  them.	  Parents	  would	  expect	  their	  children	  to	  be	  the	  people	  they	  wanted	  
and	  designed	  them	  to	  be.	  This	  “misses	  the	  sense	  of	  life	  as	  a	  gift”	  (Sandel	  62).	  By	  showing	  that	  
genetic	  enhancements	  would	  only	  make	  the	  issue	  of	  hyper-­‐parenting	  worse,	  Sandel	  presents	  us	  
with	  an	  original	  and	  thought	  out	  reason	  why	  we	  shouldn’t	  genetically	  enhance	  our	  future	  
children.	  	  	  
	   While	  specifically	  with	  sports,	  genetic	  enhancements	  threaten	  the	  appreciation	  of	  
natural	  ability,	  a	  general	  problem	  with	  designing	  children	  is	  that	  it	  threatens	  the	  sense	  of	  life	  as	  
a	  gift.	  Sandel	  believes	  that	  if	  our	  appreciation	  for	  the	  gifted	  character	  of	  human	  powers	  and	  
achievements	  is	  eroded	  by	  the	  genetic	  revolution,	  it	  will	  affect	  three	  key	  features	  of	  our	  moral	  
society—humility,	  responsibility,	  and	  solidarity	  (Sandel	  86).	  Because	  parents	  care	  so	  much	  
about	  their	  children	  but	  are	  unable	  to	  choose	  the	  kind	  they	  want,	  they	  are	  taught	  to	  be	  open	  
and	  accepting.	  He	  writes	  that	  genetic	  enhancements	  “deprive	  the	  parent	  of	  the	  humility	  and	  
enlarged	  human	  sympathies	  that	  an	  openness	  to	  the	  unbidden	  can	  cultivate”	  (Sandel	  46).	  Also,	  
if	  we	  were	  to	  view	  our	  talents	  and	  gifts	  as	  achievements	  for	  which	  we	  are	  responsible,	  it	  would	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be	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  remain	  humble	  (Sandel	  86).	  Sandel	  writes,	  “As	  humility	  gives	  away,	  
responsibility	  expands	  to	  daunting	  proportions.	  We	  attribute	  less	  to	  chance	  and	  more	  to	  
choice”	  (Sandel	  87).	  If	  this	  were	  to	  happen,	  parents	  and	  children	  of	  parents	  would	  become	  
much	  more	  easily	  blamable.	  Also,	  the	  more	  we	  are	  responsible	  for	  our	  own	  fate	  and	  that	  of	  our	  
children,	  the	  less	  our	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  with	  those	  that	  are	  less	  fortunate	  than	  us	  will	  become.	  
According	  to	  Sandel,	  genetic	  enhancements	  would	  “make	  it	  harder	  to	  foster	  the	  moral	  
sentiments	  that	  social	  solidarity	  requires”	  (Sandel	  91).	  He	  believes	  that	  a	  good	  answer	  to	  the	  
question,	  ‘Why	  do	  the	  successful	  owe	  anything	  to	  the	  least	  advantaged	  members	  of	  society?’	  is	  
that	  the	  natural	  talents	  and	  gifts	  that	  we	  are	  born	  with	  are	  due	  to	  our	  good	  fortune	  and	  not	  to	  
our	  own	  doing.	  If	  genetic	  endowments	  are	  gifts	  rather	  than	  achievements	  that	  we	  can	  claim	  
credit	  for,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  assume	  that	  we	  are	  “entitled	  to	  the	  full	  measure	  of	  the	  bounty	  
they	  reap	  in	  market	  economy”	  (Sandel	  91).	  Because	  of	  this,	  Sandel	  thinks	  we	  have	  an	  obligation	  
to	  share	  this	  bounty	  with	  those	  who	  lack	  comparable	  gifts	  (Sandel	  91).	  	  
	   Designing	  children	  also	  threatens	  the	  relation	  between	  parent	  and	  child.	  Dena	  Davis,	  in	  
her	  paper,	  Investment	  Factor	  and	  the	  Child’s	  Right	  to	  an	  Open	  Future,	  writes	  that	  parents	  so	  
fixated	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  a	  specific	  child	  will	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  be	  open	  to	  their	  
child’s	  own	  interests	  and	  natural	  direction	  (Davis	  24).	  If	  parents	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  and	  invest	  
a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  effort	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  child,	  they	  are	  “likely	  to	  feel	  entitled	  
to	  the	  desired	  result”	  (Davis	  24).	  When	  parents	  feel	  entitled	  to	  their	  child	  being	  good	  at	  sports,	  
and	  their	  child	  prefers	  painting	  instead,	  the	  relationship	  between	  parent	  and	  child	  is	  threatened	  
significantly.	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   Sandel	  explains	  that	  parental	  love	  has	  two	  aspects:	  accepting	  love	  and	  transforming	  
love.	  Accepting	  love	  affirms	  who	  the	  child	  is,	  whereas	  transforming	  love	  seeks	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  
the	  child.	  Recently,	  parents	  have	  been	  focusing	  way	  too	  much	  on	  transforming	  love	  and	  not	  
enough	  on	  accepting	  love.	  Genetic	  enhancement	  technologies	  would	  only	  further	  this.	  Parents	  
that	  are	  too	  focused	  on	  creating	  a	  perfect	  child	  will	  most	  likely	  express	  attitudes	  that	  will	  
separate	  them	  further	  from	  unconditional	  love	  (Sandel	  49-­‐50).	  It	  is	  vital	  for	  a	  child’s	  mental	  and	  
emotional	  health	  to	  know	  that	  their	  parents	  accept	  them.	  Genetic	  enhancements	  will	  make	  
worse	  the	  way	  some	  parents	  see	  their	  children	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  rather	  than	  a	  complex	  
and	  individual	  person.	  	  
	  
Section	  9:	  Equality	  	  
	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  discuss	  the	  potential	  impact	  that	  genetic	  engineering	  may	  have	  on	  
equality.	  According	  to	  Thomas	  Scanlon’s	  brute	  luck	  view,	  described	  in	  From	  Chance	  to	  Choice,	  
“persons	  should	  not	  have	  lesser	  opportunities	  due	  to	  how	  they	  fare	  in	  the	  social	  lottery—
whether	  born	  into	  a	  poor,	  uneducated	  family,	  and	  so	  on,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  limitations	  
on	  their	  opportunities	  originate	  in	  unjust	  institutions”	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  67).	  	  Based	  on	  this	  view,	  
equal	  opportunity	  requires	  efforts	  to	  counteract	  the	  effects	  of	  all	  factors	  that	  are	  beyond	  one’s	  
control	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  67).	  	  Scanlon’s	  brute	  luck	  view	  is	  appealing	  because	  it	  seems	  unfair	  to	  many	  
that	  some	  should	  have	  fewer	  opportunities	  due	  to	  factors	  over	  which	  they	  have	  no	  control—
circumstances	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  their	  personal	  choices.	  This	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Tay-­‐Sachs	  disease,	  which	  causes	  a	  person	  a	  lot	  of	  suffering	  and	  leads	  to	  death	  at	  an	  early	  age.	  
As	  a	  society,	  we	  recognize	  an	  obligation	  to	  use	  medical	  interventions	  in	  order	  to	  cure	  or	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attempt	  to	  cure	  seriously	  disabling	  disorders	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  70).	  	  Buchanan,	  Brock,	  Daniels,	  and	  
Wikler	  write,	  “If	  a	  baby	  is	  born	  with	  a	  hip	  deformity,	  for	  example,	  an	  effort	  will	  be	  made	  to	  
marshal	  social	  resources	  to	  pay	  for	  surgical	  repair	  of	  this	  condition	  if	  the	  parents	  lack	  health	  
insurance	  and	  cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  surgical	  bill	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  70).	  	  They	  explain	  that	  a	  
compelling	  justification	  for	  attempting	  to	  subsidize	  this	  procedure	  is	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  
to	  remove	  a	  serious	  obstacle	  to	  opportunity.	  Some	  of	  our	  most	  basic	  social	  institutions	  “reflect	  
a	  commitment	  to	  intervening	  in	  the	  natural	  lottery	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  equal	  opportunity,	  at	  least	  
when	  it	  is	  a	  hereditary	  or	  congenital	  disease	  that	  threatens	  opportunity	  (B,	  B,	  D&W,	  70).	  If	  we	  
are	  already	  trying	  to	  promote	  equal	  opportunity	  through	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  natural	  lottery,	  
wouldn’t	  it	  follow	  that	  we	  should	  use	  genetic	  interventions	  to	  further	  this	  cause?	  
While	  Scanlon’s	  brute	  luck	  view	  is	  important	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  equality,	  we	  must	  ask	  
ourselves:	  why	  do	  we	  seek	  equality	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  Elizabeth	  Anderson,	  in	  her	  paper,	  What	  is	  
the	  Point	  of	  Equality?,	  gives	  us	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  She	  explains	  that	  egalitarian	  political	  
movements	  in	  the	  past	  have	  fought	  against	  inequality	  because	  it	  created	  superior	  and	  inferior	  
persons	  (Anderson,	  312).	  She	  writes,	  	  
Those	  of	  superior	  rank	  were	  thought	  entitled	  to	  inflict	  violence	  on	  inferiors,	  to	  exclude	  
or	  segregate	  them	  from	  social	  life,	  to	  treat	  them	  with	  contempt,	  to	  force	  them	  to	  obey,	  
work	  without	  reciprocation,	  and	  abandon	  their	  own	  cultures	  (Anderson,	  312).	  	  
	  
When	  unequal	  social	  relations	  exist	  amongst	  people,	  they	  generate	  inequalities	  in	  the	  
distribution	  of	  freedoms,	  resources,	  and	  welfare	  (Anderson,	  312).	  Genetic	  engineering	  
technologies	  would	  threaten	  our	  ability	  to	  function	  as	  equals	  in	  society	  free	  of	  oppression.	  If	  
some	  people	  are	  able	  to	  pay	  for	  genetic	  technologies	  and	  others	  aren’t,	  inequality	  in	  society	  
would	  increase	  greatly,	  as	  would	  the	  consequences	  that	  Anderson	  mentions	  above.	  There	  is	  no	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way	  the	  government	  would	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  genetic	  engineering	  technologies	  to	  everyone—
it	  cannot	  even	  provide	  healthcare	  to	  everyone.	  Because	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  that	  everyone	  will	  have	  
access	  to	  genetic	  technologies,	  the	  inequality	  gap	  would	  inevitably	  increase.	  	  
	  
Section	  10:	  Conclusion	  
It	  seems	  that	  if	  everyone	  tried	  to	  create	  the	  child	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  the	  best	  life,	  
many	  different	  types	  of	  problematic	  issues	  would	  arise,	  issues	  that	  we	  as	  a	  society	  would	  not	  be	  
prepared	  to	  deal	  with.	  Our	  world	  may	  start	  to	  have	  eugenic-­‐like	  aspects,	  people	  with	  disabilities	  
could	  be	  negatively	  affected,	  parents	  could	  start	  to	  see	  their	  children	  as	  means	  to	  ends	  rather	  
than	  individuals,	  and	  more.	  As	  our	  knowledge	  of	  genetic	  technology	  grows,	  we	  must	  not	  forget	  
our	  ethical	  values.	  We	  want	  our	  children	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  pursuing	  their	  interests	  without	  
creating	  a	  dystopian	  society,	  and	  we	  want	  them	  flourish.	  Our	  goal	  with	  genetic	  engineering	  
should	  not	  be	  to	  create	  a	  world	  with	  perfect	  people,	  rather	  it	  should	  be	  to	  create	  a	  world	  with	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